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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
duty of the judge to admit the defendant to bail until the determination
of a writ of error.21 This statute restates the common law rule and
makes no attempt to restrict the exercise of judicial discretion.
Generally, the states do not legislate on the question of bail after
conviction, but leave such questions to the sound discretion of the courts.
Practically all decisions have been concerned with whether the prisoner
has the right to bail after conviction, and not whether the court has the
power to grant bail if it so desires.. The court in the Ex Parte Herndon
case22 upheld a statute similar to South Carolina's as being constitutional.
It should be remembered, however, that in the instant case, the court
stated that the lower courts of the state are bound by the statute, and
that only the Supreme Court, by virtue of its constitutional authority, is
above the statute. The court agreed with the general rule that the con-
victed man has no right to bail, but it maintained that the discretionary
power of the Supreme Court to allow bail cannot be hampered by legis-
lation.
Thus the Supreme Court has made the granting of bail after convic-
tion a function of the court, reserving under the doctrine of separation
of powers this power to them alone, not to be regulated by the legis-
lature. This constitutional reservation of the bail question to the Supreme
Court seems to be a unique view as to the control of bail in American
constitutional law.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-WIFE'S REMARRIAGE
AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATES ALIMONY
On October 8, 1945, plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce. Plaintiff
was awarded custody of four children and defendant was ordered to pay
$125.00 per month for support of plaintiff and the children. Soon after,
plaintiff left the state with the children, and a year later remarried. Plain-
tiff tried to conceal her second marriage from defendant. He, however,
learned of it, and went to see plaintiff and the children. At this time plain-
tiff told defendant that she wished no further support and told him to
take the children. From that date until the commencement of this action,
defendant had custody of the children most of the time. Also, from the
date of plaintiff's refusal of further support, defendant has paid only for
the support of one or more children when they were with their mother.
Plaintiff instituted this proceeding to compel defendant to pay all the
arrears of alimony. The trial court awarded plaintiff a small portion of
the amount she sought. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed, holding
21 IlI. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 38, § 774.
22 18 Oka. Cr. 68, 192 Pac. 820 (1920).
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that alimony automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the wife.
Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284 (1954).
It is imperative that we distinguish alimony awarded for support, from
a lump sum settlement to be paid in installments and a property settle-
ment. It is well settled that in these two latter situations, the remarriage
of the wife has no effect upon the husband's duty to pay, and an action
to compel the payment of arrears will be sustained.1 Also, there is no
question but that the first husband still has the obligation to pay for sup-
port for his children after the remarriage of the wife.2 Thus we narrow
the question to the effect of the remarriage of the wife on the duty
of the husband to pay alimony for monthly support.
The decision in the instant case directly overrules the precedent in
that jurisdiction; it denies the doctine set down in Myers v. Myers,3 by
stating that though it is purported to be the general rule, it was, in fact,
given only lip service. In the Myers case, the lower court had ordered
the husband to pay only the alimony between the original decree of
divorce and the wife's remarriage. The Supreme Court reversed this
decision and declared that alimony did not terminate automatically upon
the remarriage of the wife, and that this was only a factor to be con-
sidered in a petition by the husband to vary or modify the original
decree as to installments not yet due. The power to vary the original
decree as to installments in the future is not questioned when a proper
petition is presented to the court.4
The reasoning in the instant case was that the problem was one of
public policy and equitable principles. The court said:
One is hard pressed to find any rational basis to support the view that re-
marriage does not terminate the obligation of the former husband to pay ali-
mony. 5
And again:
It is illogical and unreasonable that she (the wife) should have the equivalent
of an obligation for support by way of alimony from a former husband and an
obligation from a present husband for adequate support at the same time.6
1 Green v. Starling, 203 Ga. 10, 45 S.E. 2d 188 (1947); White v. Murden, 190 Ga.
536, 9 S.E. 2d 745 (1940); King v. King, 38 Ohio St. 370 (1882); Dobson v. Dobson,
320 Ill. App. 685, 51 N.E. 2d 1010 (1943).
2 Potinger v. Potinger, 133 Fla. 442, 182 So. 762 (1938); Cunningham v. Faulkner,
163 Ga. 19, 135 S.E. 403 (1926); Tooker v. Tooker, 137 N.Y. Misc. 158, 241 N.Y.
Supp. 623 (1930).
362 Utah 90, 218 Pac. 123 (1923).
4 Parker v. Parker, 203 Cal. 787 (1928); Stillman v. Stillman, 99 I11. 196, 39 Am. Rep.
21 (1881); Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920).
5 Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284, 288 (1954).
0 Ibid.
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The court is extremely careful to point out that this decision does
not hold that there cannot be circumstances in which a wife may receive
alimony after her remarriage. The court says that in those cases where
it might be so unconscionable or inequitable to deny the wife alimony
after her remarriage, the court might, under its equitable powers, decree
that alimony shall continue. In this circumstance, the burden would be
on the wife to prove that it would be inequitable to deprive her of
further alimony.
The instant case cites jurisdictions holding that alimony automatically
terminates upon the remarriage of the wife.7 In Sides v. Pittman," the
court says that in its opinion, when a wife remarries, a new status is
created which relieves the former husband from further duty to sup-
port her.
The wife in Bowman v. Worthington9 tried to compel the payment
of alimony from her former husband after her second husband died.
The court, in refusing to compel the husband to pay, said that since
she could not get alimony while her second husband was alive, she could
not get it after his death. The Maryland Court of Appeals said bluntly
in Knabe v. Knabe10 that though the rule that alimony ceases uncon-
ditionally is contrary to the general weight of authority and ignores
the amount of change in the wife's resources and circumstances occa-
sioned by remarriage, it was the law of that state.
The court in the instant case further cites some jurisdictions that
hold that the court may, upon proper petition, retroactively eliminate
the alimony back to the date of the wife's remarriage.11
The Supreme Court of Minnesota had originally held that alimony
does not terminate on the remarriage of the wife.12 In the second case
between the same parties, however, the court stated that while remarriage
did not in and of itself as a matter of law require a modification of a de-
cree of divorce which calls for monthly payment of alimony, still it was
in ordinary cases a very powerful argument in favor of a modification. 13
In Brandt v. Brandt14 the same theory was employed. The court said
7 Arkansas: Bowman v. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522 (1867); Maryland: Knabe v.
Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A. 2d 366 (1939); Mississippi: Sides v. Pittman, 167 Miss. 751,
150 So. 211 (1933).
8 167 Miss. 751, 150 So. 211 (1933).
9 24 Ark. 522 (1867). 10 176 Md. 606, 6 A. 2d 366 (1939).
11Connecticut: Cary v. Cary, 112 Conn. 256, 152 Ad. 302 (1930); Minnesota:
Hartigan v. Hartigan, 145 Minn. 27, 176 N.W. 180 (1920); Oregon: Brandt v. Brandt,
40 Ore. 477, 67 Pac. 508 (1902); South Dakota: Wenzel v. Wenzel, 67 S.D. 537, 295
N.W. 493 (1940).
12 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 142 Minn. 274, 171 N.W. 925 (1919).
13 Hartigan v. Hartigan, 145 Minn. 27, 176 N.W. 180 (1920).
14 40 Ore. 477, 67 Pac. 508 (1902).
CASE NOTES
that a wife should not expect support from both present and former hus-
band, but it was careful to point out that the decision should not be
interpreted as holding that remarriage ipso facto dissolves the obligation
of the husband from continuing payments.
Again, in Cary v. Cary,15 it was stated that a wife by her remarriage
gives up her right to alimony, except for the very unusual case, since she
elects whether she wishes to be supported by her former or her intended
husband. Also, the court said that the wife must evidence the reason
for not stopping alimony. Also, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
has ruled that it was sound judicial discretion to modify a decree of
divorce when the record showed the wife had remarried. 16
The concurring opinion in the instant case agrees with the result that
the majority reached but differs with its reasoning. It states that whether
alimony should terminate upon the wife's remarriage should be left to
the discretion of the court rather than automatically terminating, The
concurring opinion further states that the statute relating to divorce
fully covers his problem and leaves the decision in the hands of the
court.' 7 Since the majority ruling has left the door open for a wife to
petition in the extreme case to continue the payment of alimony, the
point that the concurring opinion makes seems only to be procedural.
Illinois has gone further than the general statute of Utah and has a
statute which specifically terminates the privilege to receive alimony
after remarriage.'
By this decision, Utih has adopted an equitable and workable situation
to a very perplexing problem. It is certainly true that when a woman
remarries she should not receive support from both present and former
husband. It is also true, however, that to hold absolutely and without
recourse that a wife may not get alimony after her remarriage could
produce injustice in rare instances. Such circumstances as the pecuniary
positions of the original husband, the wife, the number of children and
the health of all parties, Could present a situation wherein the wife could
justly receive alimony after her remarriage. The holding foresees these
extreme cases and leaves he door open for a reinstatement of alimony if
a wife can prove that she deserves the continued support.
To leave the decision to the court without a general rule, as the
15 112 Conn. 256, 152 At. 302 (1930).
16 Wenzel v. Wenzel, 67 S.D. 538, 295 N.W. 493 (1940).
17 Utah C.A. (1953) § 30-3-5. "The court may make such orders in relation to the
children, property and parties and the maintenance of the parties and children as may
be equitable .... Such subsequent changes or new orders may be made by the court
with respect to the disposal of the children or the distribution of property as shall be
reasonable or proper."
18111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 40, § 19; "A party shall not be entitled to alimony and
maintenance after remarriage ..
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concurring judge advocates, is to ignore the overwhelming number of
cases in which the general rule can be justly applied. It is certainly better
to have a general rule and an exception that can be applied in an extraor-
dinary case, with the burden upon the wife to prove that the gen-
eral rule is inequitable, than to have a rule by which it is necessary for
the husband each time to come in and prove his former wife's remarriage
supplies sufficient reason for an abolishment of the duty to pay alimony.
INSURANCE-DELIVERY TO INSURER'S AGENT HELD
SUFFICIENT WHERE POLICY REQUIRES
ACCEPTANCE BY INSURED
Plaintiff made an application for insurance on February 20, 1948,
through defendant's agent. After plaintiff paid the first year's premium,
his application and a favorable report on his physical condition were
sent to defendant. On March 16, 1948, a policy was issued and mailed
to defendant's agent, at which time the plaintiff was alive and in good
health. On March 17, 1948, the day the agent says the policy was de-
livered to him, plaintiff was found dead as a result of asphyxiation. The
application provided that before the policy was to take effect, it should
be "delivered to and accepted by" applicant. The Superior Court en-
tered judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma, three justices dissenting, with a fourth dissenting in part,
held that since there was an unconditional delivery to the agent, manual
delivery or further acceptance was unnecessary. Mid-Continent Life
Ins. Co. v. Dees, 269 P. 2d 322 (Okla., 1954).
The problem in the instant case revolves around the question of
whether delivery to the agent of the insurer constitutes delivery to the
insured. Before attempting to analyze the problem, it is important to
determine how the courts define delivery. In the case of Harris v.
Regester' the court defined delivery as a transfer of possession or con-
trol of the policy to the insured. This interpretation has been clarified
to mean that the intention of the parties as to when delivery is to take
effect controls, and not the manual possession of the policy.2 The court
in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith3 held:
Where there is an intention on the part of the insurer to part with the con-
trol of the policy, and to place it in the control of the insured or some person
acting for him, that is sufficient to constitute delivery. 4
170 Md. 109, 16 At. 386 (1889).
2 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 129 Miss. 544, 91 So. 456 (1922).
3Ibid.
4 Ibid., at 546 and 458.
